Cited by

As the respondent recognizes in his brief, we have previously held that jury trials are not required in civil commitment proceedings under RSA chapter 135-C.

id.; see also In re Sandra H., 150 N.H. 634, 640-41 (2004) (concluding that, although expert recommended involuntary admission for one year, court could order admission for two years).

Because the Federal Constitution offers no greater protection than our State Constitution, we reach the same result under both.

In re Sandra H., 150 N.H. 634, 637-38 (2004) (quotation omitted).

See, e.g., In re Sandra H., 150 N.H. 634, 637-38 (2004) (observing, in an involuntary civil commitment case, that we apply “the most exacting scrutiny” when fundamental rights are impinged (quotation omitted)).

“Partly as a result of this test, and at times independently thereof, it has been decided that a guaranty of trial by jury cannot be invoked in special, statutory or summary proceedings unknown to the common law.” Hallahan v. Riley, 94 N.H. 338, 339-40 (1947); accord In re Sandra H., 150 N.H. 634, 636 (2004).

Next, we must determine the appropriate standard of review to apply to the ordinance.

itutional obligation but, quite the contraiy, it has a compelling state interest not to do so.5 Although the submitted questions are directed to the equal protection clauses of both the State and Federal Constitutions, we have previously held that the F`ourteenth Amendment provides no greater level of protection than does Part l, Article 2 of the New Hampshire Constitution, se_e In re Sandra H., 150 N.H. 634, 637 (2004), and we have applied an analysis identical to that used by the federal court

‘We have held, in accordance with the United States Supreme Court, that the equal protection guarantee” in the State Constitution “is ‘essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.’ ” In re Sandra H., 150 N.H. 634, 637 (2004) (quoting Cleburne v. *613 Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)).

The equal protection guarantee is “essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” In re Sandra H., 150 N.H. 634, 637 (2004) (quotation omitted).

The defendant counters that because the jury selection process is an important substantive right, we must apply intermediate scrutiny.

“[T]he equal protection guarantee is ‘essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.’ ” In re Sandra H., 150 N.H. 634, 637 (2004) (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)).

to special, statutory or summary proceedings unknown to the common law.” In re Sandra H., 150 N.H. 634, 636 (2004).

In re Sandra H., 150 N.H. 634, 637-38 (2004) (quotation omitted).

“[T]he equal protection guarantee is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” In re Sandra H., 150 N.H. 634, 637 (2004) (quotation omitted).

We “vacate[d] the trial court’s ruling and remand[ed] for application of the equal protection analysis set forth” in In re Sandra H., 150 N.H. 634 (2004).

“We will uphold the probate court’s ruling unless no rational fact-finder could have made the findings by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Sandra H., 150 N.H. 634, 640 (2004).

“In considering an equal protection challenge under our State Constitution, we must first determine the [correct] standard of review by examining the purpose and scope of the State-created classification and the individual rights affected.” In re Sandra H., 150 N.H. 634, 637 (2004) (quotation omitted).

Bragg v. Director, N.H. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 141 N.H. 677, 678-79, 690 A.2d 571 (1997) (setting forth state due process analysis); WMUR Channel Nine v. N.H. Dep't of Fish and Game, 154 N.H. ___, ___, 908 A.2d 146, 149-50 (2006) (discussing federal due process analysis); In re Sandra H., 150 N.H. 634, 637-38, 846 A.2d 513 (2004) (discussing state and federal equal protection analysis).

Bragg v. Director, N.H. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 141 N.H. 677, 678-79 (1997) (setting forth state due process analysis); WMUR Channel Nine v. N.H. Dep’t of Fish and Game, 154 N.H. 46, 49 (2006) (discussing federal due process analysis); In re Sandra H., 150 N.H. 634, 637-38 (2004) (discussing state and federal equal protection analysis).

“In considering an equal protection challenge under our State Constitution, we must first determine the appropriate standard of review by examining the purpose and scope of the State-created classification and the individual rights affected.” In re Sandra H., 150 N.H. 634, 637 (2004) (quotation omitted).

The equal protection guarantee is “essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” In re Sandra H., 150 N.H. 634, 637 (2004) (quotation omitted).

The petitioner must prove dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence.

Strict scrutiny is the correct standard to apply when determining the constitutionality of a statute that touches upon a fundamental right.

LeClair v. LeClair, 137 N.H. 213, 222 (1993); see In re Sandra II., 150 N.H. 634, 638 (2004).

When the language used in the statute is clear and unambiguous, its meaning is not subject to modification by judicial construction.

When the language used in the statute is clear and unambiguous, its meaning is not subject to modification by judicial construction.

We have also recently clarified our equal protection analysis, harmonizing it with that used by the federal courts.

Recently, we clarified our equal protection analysis.