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The Dietzes rely on Bacon v. Town of Enfield, 150 N.H. 468 (2004), as support for this proposition.

In concluding that “the ZBA reasonably considered the cumulative effect that such variances may have on the area,” the superior court relied on language from Chief Justice Broderick’s opinion in Bacon v. Town of Enfield, 150 N.H. 468 (2004).

State v. Hofland, 151 N.H. 322, 325 (2004) (quotation omitted); see Anderson v. Motorsports Holdings, 155 N.H. 491, 499 (2007); Bacon v. Town of Enfield, 150 N.H. 468, 473-74 (2004); Pope v. Little Boar’s Head Dist., 145 N.H. 531, 535 (2000); Alexander v. Town of Hampstead, 129 N.H. 278, 283 (1987); State v. Monahan, 125 N.H. 17, 26 (1984); State v. Pinsince, 105 N.H. 38, 41 (1963).

“The variance was originally conceived as a means to ensure the constitutionality of zoning ordinances by building in a mechanism that would avoid imposing hardship on individual landowners.” Bacon v. Town of Enfield, 150 N.H. 468, 477 (2004) (quotation omitted); see also RATHKOPF, supra § 58:1 (identifying the “common purpose behind allowing variances” as a means to correct the “occasional inequities that are created by general zoning ordinances”).

Since the variance at issue is to install a sign on a building, we hold that the ZBA and trial court did not err by focusing upon the building’s size to determine whether the property has “special conditions.” To support its assertion, Harborside relies upon the concurrence to Bacon v. Town of Enfield, 150 N.H. 468 (2004), which stated that a homeowner could meet the “special conditions” part of the Simplex unnecessary hardship test only by showing that her property was unique in its setting, no

Bacon v. Town of Enfield, 150 N.H. 468, 473 (2004).

Bacon v. Town of Enfield, 150 N.H. 468, 474 (2004).

Bacon v. Town of Enfield, 150 N.H. 468, 471 (2004).

Bacon v. Town of Enfield, 150 N.H. 468, 471 (2004).

Bacon v. Town of Enfield, 150 N.H. 468, 471 (2004).

Bacon v. Town of Enfield, 150 N.H. 468, 477 (2004) (Duggan and Dalianis, JJ., concurring specially).

Bacon v. Town of Enfield, 150 N.H. 468, 471 (2004).

contain evidence, that the purported “selective enforcement of the ordinance against him was a conscious intentional discrimination,” *326 Alexander v. Town of Hampstead, 129 N.H. 278, 283 (1987) (quotations omitted); nor does he assert that the city “impermissibly established classifications and, therefore, treated similarly situated individuals, in a different manner,” Bacon v. Town of Enfield, 150 N.H. 468, 474 (2004).

Even this court divided recently on how to analyze unnecessary hardship in the context of an area variance.