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“In order for a police officer to undertake an investigatory stop, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific, articulable facts taken together with rational inferences from those facts, that the particular person stopped has been, is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.” State v. Turmel, 150 N.H. 377, 380 (2003); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968).

McKinnon- Andrews, 151 N.H. at 26-27; see Zuniga, 372 P.3d at 1058-59; see also, e.g., 7 State v. Turmel, 150 N.H. 377, 381 (2003); cf. Blesdell-Moore, 166 N.H. at 189 (“We think it impossible for a combination of wholly innocent factors to combine into a suspicious conglomeration unless there are concrete reasons for such an interpretation.” (emphasis added; quotation and brackets omitted)).

“That observed activity could be consistent with both guilty and innocent behavior, however, does not mean that an officer must rule out innocent explanations before proceeding.” State v. Turmel, 150 N.H. 377, 381 (2003).

to confirming or dispelling the suspicion he had developed.” See State v. Turmel, 150 N.H. 377, 383 (2003) (noting that “[d]uring a legal investigatory stop, an officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions”).

State v. Galgay, 145 N.H. 100, 103, 750 A.2d 52 (2000); accord State v. Turmel, 150 N.H. 377, 381, 838 A.2d 1279 (2003).

A suspect is considered “seized” if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding an investigatory stop, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.

In making this determination, we do not consider each fact in isolation or necessarily compare the facts to another case.

The State relies upon State v. Turmel, 150 N.H. 377 (2003), arguing as follows: In Turmel we found no custody despite concluding that the defendant’s movements had been curtailed; in this case, because the defendant’s movements were never curtailed, a fortiori, he was not in custody.

*274 “An investigatory stop may metamorphose into an overly prolonged or intrusive detention (and, thus, become unlawful).” State v. Turmel, 150 N.H. 377, 383 (2003) (quotation omitted).

The police must give Miranda warnings before conducting custodial interrogation.

“Custody entitling a defendant to Miranda protections requires,formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with formal arrest.” State v. Turmel, 150 N.H. 377, 382-83 (2003) (citation omitted).

The Federal Constitution offers the defendant no greater protection than does the State Constitution with regard to the defendant’s rights under Miranda.

Because the Federal Constitution affords no greater protection than the State Constitution in these areas, see State v. Turmel, 150 N.H. 377, 382 (2003); Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21, we reach the same result under the Federal Constitution as we do under the State Constitution.

State v. Turmel, 150 N.H. 377, 380 (2003); see Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21.

cites the officer’s testimony that “the reason [he] wanted her out of the vehicle [was] to see if the odor of alcohol was on her,” she argues that his “bare open-container suspicion did not give him any legitimate reason to order her out of the car.” To determine the sufficiency of the officer’s suspicion, we must consider the facts he articulated in light of all of the surrounding circumstances.