Cited by

“Whether the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in discovering the causal connection between the injury and the defendant’s alleged act or omission is a question of fact.” Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813, 825 (2005).

tiffs to ask the jury to “send a clear message” with its verdicts in closing argument, the trial court sustainably exercised its discretion by not giving an immediate curative instruction and instead later instructing the jury that it should not award a verdict to punish the defendant and that the plaintiffs had to prove the defendant caused their injuries); Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813, 837 (2005) (“[T]he jury is presumed to follow the court’s instructions.”).

“Whether the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in discovering the causal connection between the injury and the defendant’s alleged act or omission is a question of fact.” Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813, 825 (2005).

It also cites Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813 (2005), for the proposition that “economic loss is characterized as damage that occurs to the inferior product itself, through deterioration or non-accidental causes.

Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813, 847 (2005).

Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813, 848 (2005).

Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813, 851 (2005) (stating that the trial court properly instructed jury that the plaintiff could not recover more than once for the same loss).

is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer.” Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813, 831 (2005) (quotation omitted).

“Therefore, to create an express warranty, the promise or affirmation of fact must both relate to the goods and become part of the basis of the contractual bargain.” Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813, 841 (2005).

Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813, 848 (2005).

Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813, 848, 891 A.2d 477 (2005).

Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813, 848 (2005).

Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813, 847 (2005).

“We review the trial court’s decisions on the admissibility of evidence under an unsustainable exercise of discretion standard.” Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813, 832 (2005).

“We review the trial court’s decisions on the admissibility of evidence under an unsustainable exercise of discretion standard.” Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813, 832 (2005).

Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813, 848 (2005).

review the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo.” Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813, 830 (2005).

Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813, 825 (2005).” See also Brown v. Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hosp., 117 N.H. 739, 742 (1977) (although the correct formulation of the discovery rule poses a question of law, the application of it presents a question of fact).

In the Matter of Carr & Edmunds, 156 N.H. 498, 502-03 (2007) (holding that father failed to establish that any unfairness resulted from mother’s allegedly inconsistent positions in seeking to modify child support pursuant to statutory right); cf. Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813, 849 (2005) (holding that defendant would derive an unfair advantage by taking a factual position inconsistent with one taken in an earlier action in which defendant prevailed).

801(c), which is not specifically excluded as non-hearsay by Rule 801(d).” Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813, 832 (2005) (quotation omitted).

Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813, 824 (2005).

Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813, 848 (2005).

Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813, 830 (2005).

Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813, 847 (2005).

Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813, 834 (2005).

The doctrine of judicial estoppel is as follows: “[WJhere a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, it may not thereafter, simply because its interests have changed, assume a contrary position.” Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813, 848 (2005) (quotation, *157 brackets and ellipsis omitted).

Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813, 838 (2005).

Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813, 838 (2005).

when it ultimately ruled that judicial estoppel did not apply to the facts of this case.” “The doctrine of judicial estoppel generally prevents a party from prevailing in one phase of a case on an argument and then relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in another phase.” In re Pack Monadnock, 147 N.H. 419, 425-26 (2002) (quotation omitted); see Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813, 848 (2005).