Cited by

at 112 (recognizing tort for invasion of plaintiff’s solitude or seclusion); Karch v. BayBank FSB, 147 N.H. 525, 534-35 (2002) (recognizing tort for public disclosure of private facts); Remsburg v. Docusearch, 149 N.H. 148, 157 (2003) (recognizing tort for appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness).

“All persons have a duty to exercise reasonable care not to subject others to an unreasonable risk of harm.” Remsburg v. Docusearch, 149 N.H. 148, 153 (2003).

“In certain limited circumstances, however, we have recognized that there are exceptions to the general rule where a duty to exercise reasonable care will arise.” Remsburg v. Docusearch, 149 N.H. 148, 154 (2003).

Remsburg v. Docusearch, 149 N.H. 148, 154-55 (2003) (private investigator owes duty to third party where disclosure of information to client creates foreseeable risk of criminal misconduct against third party); Dupont v. Aavid Thermal Technologies, 147 N.H. 706, 713 (2002) (plaintiff sufficiently alleged facts establishing employer’s duty to protect empl

While we have, under “special circumstances,” permitted recovery against a defendant whose actions created a sufficiently foreseeable risk of criminal misconduct by a third party, see Remsburg v. Docusearch, 149 N.H. 148, 155 (2003), the parties have not addressed the issue of third-party liability in their briefs.

n assuming that the defendant marshaled a good faith argument that the salon was engaging in a prohibited act, he fails to explain exactly how his threatened CPA claim fits within the statutory language conferring private-party standing upon only those “injured by another’s use of any method, act or practice declared unlawful.” RSA 358-A: 10, I (emphasis added); see, e.g., Remsburg v. Docusearch, 149 N.H. 148, 160 (2003) (holding that person deceived by investigator proper party to bring suit un

The notion of reasonable risk includes examining both the likelihood that harm will occur and the magnitude of the harm to which the person is exposed.

Accordingly, any clear right to medical confidentiality in prisons can only be said to exist by virtue of statute, administrative regulation or the common law of torts such as those relating to an invasion of privacy, see, e.g., Remsburg v. Docusearch, 149 N.H. 148, 156 (2003).

Remsburg v. Docusearch, 149 N.H. 148, 159-60 (2003) (“The statute defines who may bring a private action broadly, and by its plain meaning does not limit the class of persons who have standing to those in privity with the defendant.” (citation omitted)).

RSA 106-F:9 (Supp. 2005) (investigators must file surety bond that is “so conditioned that the person bonded shall conduct his or her business in a lawful and honest manner without committing, compounding, aiding or abetting the commission of any criminal offense”); see also Remsburg v. Docusearch, 149 N.H. 148,154-55 (2003) (ruling that private investigators have duty to exercise reasonable care in disclosing third party’s personal information to client, in part, because of foreseeable risk tha

In Remsburg v. Docusearch, 149 N.H. 148, 157 (2003), we adopted the tort of invasion of privacy by the appropriation of an individual’s name or likeness.

Recognizing the “fundamental unfairness of holding private citizens responsible for the unanticipated criminal acts of third parties,” Remsburg v. Docusearch, 149 N.H. 148, 153-54 (2003), this court has identified three limited exceptions to the general rule that citizens have no such duty at common law: (1) where there is a special relationship between the parties; (2) where special circumstances exist including situations where the defendant’s acts create an “especial temptation and o

The claims made by Remsburg and the facts underlying the complaint are detailed in Remsburg v. Docusearch, 149 N.H. 148,151-53 (2003), and need only briefly be summarized here.