Cited by

b. Causation To establish that the defendant's neglect caused the victim to sustain *223 serious bodily injury, the State had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that her conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the victim's serious bodily injury and that any other factors were not the sole substantial cause of it.

days in her own waste “without calling for help.” b. Causation To establish that the defendant’s neglect caused the victim to sustain serious bodily injury, the State had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that her conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the victim’s serious bodily injury and that any other factors were not the sole substantial cause of it.

Causation is an element of both manslaughter, see RSA 630:2, I, and negligent homicide, see RSA 630:3, I. “To establish causation, the State needed to prove not only that the prohibited result would not have occurred but for the conduct of the defendant, but also that the defendant’s conduct was the legal (or proximate) cause of the prohibited result.” State v. Lamprey, 149 N.H. 364, 366 (2003).

State v. Lamprey, 149 N.H. 364, 370 (2003) (“The third prong incorporates the standards of New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 403 requiring a showing of unfair prejudice.”).

id.; see also State v. Lamprey, 149 N.H. 364, 366 (2003) (“Reversal of a jury verdict is unwarranted when a jury charge fairly covers the issues and law of a case.”).

The defendant’s reckless act must also have been the proximate cause of the death, which is “the cause without which the event would not have occurred, and the predominating cause, a substantial factor from which the event follows as a natural, direct and immediate consequence.” State v. Lamprey, 149 N.H. 364, 367 (2003) (quotation omitted).

LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 6.4(a), at 466 (2d ed. 2003); see also State v. Lamprey, 149 N.H. 364, 366 (2003).

“To establish causation, the State needed to prove not only that the prohibited result would not have occurred but for the conduct of the defendant, but also that the defendant’s conduct was the legal (or proximate) cause of the prohibited result.” State v. Lamprey, 149 N.H. 364, 366 (2003).

While the defendant argues financial irresponsibility, resulting in part from having a mistress and gambling, are the types of acts that will appeal to a juror’s outrage, such evidence is not the sort of evidence that would arouse the emotions of a jury and cause it to decide the case on emotion rather than the evidence.

State v. Lamprey, 149 N.H. 364, 366 (2003) (allegations of error in jury instructions are evaluated by interpreting instructions in their entirety as reasonable juror would have understood them and in light of all evidence in case).

The scope and wording of jury instructions is generally within the sound discretion of the trial court.

The scope and wording of jury instructions is generally within the sound discretion of the trial court.

“A trial court is accorded broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and we review the trial court’s ruling under the unsustainable exercise of discretion standard.” State v. Lamprey, 149 N.H. 364, 370 (2003) (citation omitted).