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[¶20] On similar public policy grounds, we have acknowledged an exception to the spousal privilege to allow testimony by one spouse about the other spouse’s child abuse.

State v. Pelletier, 149 N.H. 243, 251-52 (2003) (affirming the trial court’s determination that a physician’s expert testimony was reliable given the physician’s extensive background “providing child abuse evaluations for detecting and investigating child sexual abuse in hundreds of cases”); United States v. Alzanki, 54 F.3d 994, 1006 (1st Cir. 1995)

State v. Pelletier, 149 N.H. 243, 250-51 (2003) (relying upon trial testimony to affirm ruling that expert was qualified); cf. Stachulski, 171 N.H. at 163 (reviewing denial of motion in limine based only upon offers of proof presented at pretrial hearing).

[¶12] Generally, the determination of whether the spousal privilege applies is “intensely factual and rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Pelletier, 149 N.H. 243, 247 (2003).

Reinholz, 169 N.H. at 28; State v. Pelletier, 149 N.H. 243, 253 5 (2003).

We accord considerable deference to a trial court’s evidentiary rulings and will intervene only when they demonstrate an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

State v. Pelletier, 149 N.H. 243, 247 (2003) (only acts that are “attributable to the husband-wife relation” are subject to the evidentiary privilege (quotation omitted)).

The State has the burden of proving harmless error, which it must do by establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the erroneously admitted evidence did not affect the verdict.

id.; see also State v. Pelletier, 149 N.H. 243, 253 (2003).

104(a); see State v. Pelletier, 149 N.H. 243, 247 (2003) (marital privilege); State v. Gordon, 141 N.H. 703, 705 (1997) (attorney-client privilege).

Ct. R. 98(H); see also State v. Pelletier, 149 N.H. 243, 250 (2003).

On appeal, the landowner argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine to exclude Cowall’s expert testimony related to the second appraisal because it did not rise to the threshold level of reliability required by New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

State v. Connor, 156 N.H. 544, 546 (2007); State v. Pelletier, 149 N.H. 243, 253 (2003).

“As such, he cannot now complain of error.” State v. Pelletier, 149 N.H. 243, 253 (2003); see State v. Simonds, 135 N.H. 203, 207 (1991).

We generally review a trial court’s determination of expert reliability under Rule 702 for an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

While the trial court did not issue an instruction to the jury informing them of the limited purpose for the testimony, the trial court had no obligation to do so absent a request therefore, or an objection to the lack thereof, by the defendant.

plied the ACE-V methodology reliably in this case because Corson’s “ ‘case notes’ did not detail her process or findings, and because the verification process, indicated only by another examiner’s initials, did not make reliable the initial examiner’s conclusions.” II We generally review a trial court’s determination of expert reliability under Rule 702 for an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

In State v. Pelletier, 149 N.H. 243, 249 (2003), we determined that the spousal privilege under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 504 would yield when disclosure would *618 provide relevant information concerning alleged sexual abuse of a child.

Generally, we accord considerable deference to a trial court’s evidentiary rulings and will only intervene when they demonstrate an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

Wo review the trial court’s rulings on admissibility of evidence under an unsustainable exercise of discretion standard.