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The fact that the trial court did not expressly address the $85,000 in deposits during the relevant period does not imply that the court did not consider the issue.

The fact that the court’s order does not specifically refer to the counseling records does not mean that the court failed to consider them.

The fact that the trial court did not discuss the purchase price of each lot in its order does not imply that the court did not consider this evidence.

The defendants also argue that the trial court erred in failing to consider the “trade or commerce” issue, and in failing to make a specific finding that their conduct constituted “trade or commerce.” The fact that the court did not expressly state in its order that the defendants’ conduct constituted trade or commerce does not mean that the court did not consider this issue.

The fact that the trial court did not discuss these other factors in its order does not imply that it did not consider them.

Even assuming, without deciding, that the facts she claims the court “overlooked” were undisputed, the fact that the trial court did not discuss them in its order does not imply that it did not consider them.

The fact that the trial court did not discuss these facts in its order does not imply that it did not consider them.

The fact that the trial court did not discuss this issue in its order does not imply that the court did not consider it.

The trial court stated that it entered its decree “[a]fter consideration of the parties’ testimony.” The fact that the trial court did not discuss each of these factors in its order does not imply that the court did not consider them.

We must also assume that the trial court made all findings necessary to support its decision.

In re Jonathan T., 148 N.H. 296, 300 (2002); see also Sup.

Absent the requests for findings and rulings, we must assume that the trial court made all findings necessary to support its decision, see In re Jonathan T., 148 N.H. 296, 304 (2002), and that, contrary to the respondent’s assertions, it did consider the parties’ respective needs when dividing their property.

However, this deficiency is not fatal because neither party requested findings of fact or rulings of law, see RSA 567-A:4 (2007); see also In re Jonathan T., 148 N.H. 296, 304 (2002), and, as we have previously stated, “in the absence of specific findings, the trial court is presumed to have made all findings necessary to support its decree,” Burns v. Bradley, 120 N.H. 542, 546 (1980) (quotation omitted) (upholding a trial court’s grant of directed verdict even though “the record d[id]

In re Jonathan T., 148 N.H. 296, 301 (2002); RSA 169-C:24-a, III(c).

Further, in the absence of specific findings, a court is presumed *497 to have made all findings necessary to support its decree.

To satisfy its burden under RSA 170-C:5, III, the State must make reasonable efforts to rectify the conditions leading to a neglect finding.