Cited by

State v. Hall, 148 N.H. 671, 676 (2002) (concluding that Woodard was “easily distinguishable” because the disputed evidence “did not relate to the defendant’s homosexual conduct, and the defendant was not charged with homosexual assaults”).

Even assuming the officers misled the defendant regarding the polygraph results, “the police are not prohibited from misleading a suspect.” Hernandez, 162 N.H. at 706; see also State v. Hall, 148 N.H. 671, 673 (2002) (“Although the officers may have misled the defendant into believing they had incriminating evidence, their comments were not so deceptive as to render the confession involuntary.”).

Epstein, 426 F.3d at 439; Dion, 164 N.H. at 551; cf. State v. Hall, 148 N.H. 671, 675 (2002) (recognizing that evidence which was “part and parcel” of the same episode was properly evaluated under New Hampshire Rules of Evidence 401 and 403).

However, “police are not prohibited from misleading a suspect.” Hernandez, 162 N.H. at 706; see also State v. Hall, 148 N.H. 671, 673 (2002) (“Although the officers may have misled the defendant into believing they had incriminating evidence, their comments were not so deceptive as to render the confession involuntary.”).

At the end of the interview, even Hernandez agreed that the detectives treated her with respect throughout.

See, e.g., State v. Hall, 148 N.H. 671, 672 (2002) (explaining standard for evaluating voluntariness of a confession after suppression hearing).

State v. Hall, 148 N.H. 671, 675 (2002) (no mistrial where testifying officer “made vague and ambiguous references to the suppression hearing” and revealed no information about what transpired at the hearing, its substance or its outcome).

We will not overturn the trial court’s rulings on admissibility of evidence pursuant to Rules 401 and 403 absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

We uphold, therefore, the trial court’s decision that neither an immediate curative instruction nor a declaration of a mistrial was necessary, and conclude that the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion was not an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

We thus hold that the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion was not an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

at 359, we will not overturn its decision denying a mistrial absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion, see State v. Hall, 148 N.H. 671, 674 (2002).

Furthermore, when inadmissible testimony, erroneously presented to the jury, is ambiguous, “a defendant is not so substantially prejudiced that a mistrial is required.” State v. Hall, 148 N.H. 671, 675 (2002) (quotation omitted).