Cited by

See, e.g., McKenna, 166 N.H. at 685 (interrogation for “one hour and fifteen minutes” weighed neither for nor against a finding of custody); State v. Locke, 149 N.H. 1, 6 (2002) (three and one-half hours of questioning not excessive, no custody); Jennings, 155 N.H. at 774 (“nearly two hours” of questioning weighed in favor of custody).

Although we typically require a defendant to demonstrate actual prejudice from a delay to prevail on a speedy trial claim, when a defendant does not — or cannot — articulate the particular harm caused by delay, we inquire whether the length and reason for the delay weigh so heavily in the defendant’s favor that prejudice need not be specifically demonstrated.

In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss based upon a denial of the right to a speedy trial, “we defer to the trial court’s factual findings unless those findings are clearly erroneous, and consider de novo the court’s conclusions of law in respect to those factual findings.” State v. Locke, 149 N.H. 1, 7 (2002).

State v. Locke, 149 N.H. 1, 8 (2002) (“[W]hen a defendant does not — or cannot — articulate the particular harm caused by delay, we inquire whether the length and reason for the delay weigh so heavily in the defendant’s favor that prejudice need not be specifically demonstrated.” (quotation omitted.)

Marin, 172 N.H. at 164; State v. Locke, 149 N.H. 1, 6-7 (2002).

The defendant argues that: (1) “excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify,” State v. Locke, 149 N.H. 1, 9 (2002) (addressing 55 month delay from arrest to start of trial); and (2) “the delays and piecemeal presentation of trial evidence [ ] caused [the] memories of parties, including the Court, to be detrimentally affected.” However, we typically require a defendant to demonstrate actual prejudice from

When “[t]here [is] no evidence of shouting or harsh tones at any time during the interview,” it weighs against a finding of custody.

McKenna, 166 N.H. at 680; State v. Locke, 149 N.H. 1, 7 (2002) (“Given the repeated advice that he was free to leave, we conclude that a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would not believe he was restrained to the degree associated with formal arrest.”); State v. Johnson, 140 N.H. 573, 578 (1995) (finding no custody, based, in part, upon fact that trooper in

Upon this record, we conclude that the trial court allowed the defendant sufficient cross-examination to meet constitutional standards.

State v. Bernaby, 139 N.H. 420, 422 (1995); cf. Brooks, 162 N.H. at 581, 584 (holding thirty-two month delay did not deprive defendant of right to speedy trial); State v. Locke, 149 N.H. 1, 9, 10 (2002) (holding fifty-five month delay did not deprive defendant of right to speedy trial); Bernaby, 139 N.H. at 421, 422, 423 (holding thirty-eight month delay did not deprive defendant of right to speedy trial).

State v. Locke, 149 N.H. 1, 7 (2002) (“Given the repeated advice that he was free to leave, we conclude that a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would not believe that he was restrained to the degree associated with formal arrest.”); State v. Hammond, 144 N.H. 401, 404 (1999) (finding no custody, based, in part, upon fact that offic

Any issues raised in the defendant’s notice of appeal but not addressed in his brief are deemed waived.

See, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2916 (2010); State v. Locke, 149 N.H. 1, 10 (2002).

The first factor, the length of the delay, is a triggering mechanism: we do not consider the remaining factors unless the delay is presumptively prejudicial.

We will not overturn the trial court’s factual findings relevant to the question of custody unless they are contrary to the manifest weight of the *773 evidence.

Although we will not overturn the factual findings of the trial court unless they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, we review the ultimate determination of custody de novo.

The constitutional right to cross-examine adverse witnesses in criminal cases is fundamental and includes the right to impeach a witness’s credibility through cross-examination.

We defer to the trial court’s factual findings unless those findings are clearly erroneous, and consider de novo the court’s conclusions of law with respect to those factual findings.