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“To determine the reliability of expert testimony, the trial court must apply RSA 516:29-a, portions of which codify principles outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-95 (1993),” which were adopted by this court in Baker Valley Lumber v. Ingersoll- Rand, 148 N.H. 609, 614 (2002).

Section II codifies the four factors from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993), that we applied in Baker Valley Lumber v. Ingersoll-Rand, 148 N.H. 609, 614, 616 (2002).

Section II of RSA 516:29-a codifies the four Daubert factors we applied in Baker Valley Lumber v. Ingersoll-Rand, 148 N.H. 609, 614, 616 (2002).

Baker Valley Lumber v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 148 N.H. 609, 613 (2002).

In the Matter of Heinrich & Curotto, 160 N.H. 650, 657-58 (2010); cf. Baker Valley Lumber v. Ingersoll-Rand, 148 N.H. 609, 615 (2002) (explaining that objections to the basis of an expert’s opinion go to the weight to be accorded the opinion evidence, and not to its admissibility).

“[E]xpert testimony must rise to a threshold level of reliability to be admissible.” Baker Valley Lumber, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 148 N.H. 609, 614 (2002).

“To determine the reliability of expert testimony, the trial court must apply RSA 516:29-a, portions of which codify principles outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-95 (1993),” and which were applied by this court in Baker Valley Lumber v. Ingersoll-Rand, 148 N.H. 609, 614 (2002).

Id.; see also Baker Valley Lumber v. Ingersoll-Rand, 148 N.H. 609, 614-16 (2002) (applying the Daubert framework to evaluate the reliability of expert testimony under Rule 702).

Id.; see also Baker Valley Lumber v. Ingersoll-Rand, 148 N.H. 609, 614 (2002) (applying the Daubert framework to evaluate the reliability of expert testimony under Rule 702).

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Baker Valley Lumber v. Ingersoll-Rand, 148 N.H. 609, 614 (2002) (adopting Daubert standard); see also RSA 516:29-a (2007) (codifying the Daubert standards).

at 85; see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592- 5 95; Baker Valley Lumber v. Ingersoll-Rand, 148 N.H. 609, 614 (2002) (applying the Daubert framework to evaluate the reliability of expert testimony under Rule 702).

State v. Whittaker, 158 N.H. 762, 773 (2009) (“Provided that the trial court finds that the expert’s methodology is reliable, it is up to the fact finder to determine the weight and credibility to be accorded the expert’s testimony.”); see also Baker Valley Lumber v. Ingersoll-Rand, 148 N.H. 609, 615-16 (2002).

Baker Valley Lumber v. Ingersoll-Rand, 148 N.H. 609, 614 (2002) (adopting standard of reliability set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).

Baker Valley Lumber v. Ingersoll-Rand, 148 N.H. 609, 617-18 (2002) (trial court properly disallowed portion of expert testimony where identity of expert and his opinion were disclosed, but expert’s opinion on a particular subject was withheld); In the Matter of Letendre & Letendre, 149 N.H. 31, 37-38 (2002) (trial court properly excluded expert testimony where iden

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Baker Valley Lumber v. Ingersoll-Rand, 148 N.H. 609, 614 (2002) (adopting Daubert standard).

Baker Valley Lumber v. Ingersoll-Rand, 148 N.H. 609, 615-16 (2002).

Baker Valley Lumber v. Ingersoll-Rand, 148 N.H. 609, 616 (2002).

Baker Valley Lumber v. Ingersoll-Rand, 148 N.H. 609, 613 (2002).

He argued: (1) Corson was not qualified to testify as a fingerprint expert; (2) the fingerprint methodology used by the NHSPFL, called ACE-V methodology, is generally unreliable under RSA 516:29-a (2007), New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 702 (Rule 702), Baker Valley Lumber v. Ingersoll-Rand, 148 N.H. 609 (2002), and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); (3) even if ACE-V methodology is generally reliable, Corson did not apply that methodology reliably to his case; and

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Baker Valley Lumber v. Ingersoll-Rand, 148 N.H. 609 (2002) (adopting the Daubert test to determine the admissibility of scientific evidence).

Baker Valley Lumber v. Ingersoll-Rand, 148 N.H. 609, 612 (2002).

Baker Valley Lumber v. Ingersoll-Rand, 148 N.H. 609, 612 (2002).

be called, usually a specialist in a particular branch within a profession will not be required.” Baker Valley Lumber v. Ingersoll-Rand, 148 N.H. 609, 612-13 (2002) (quotation omitted).

Although we have adopted the test set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence, see Baker Valley Lumber v. Ingersoll-Rand, 148 N.H. 609, 614 (2002), both parties stipulated that, for the purposes of this case, the proper standard for determining the scientific admissibility of PCR-based STR DNA testing is that set forth in Frye v. United States.

Baker Valley Lumber v. Ingersoll-Rand, 148 N.H. 609, 612 (2002).

Baker Valley Lumber v. Ingersoll-Rand, 148 N.H. 609 (2002).