Cited by

See, e.g., Van Der Stok, 151 N.H. at 685 (regarding bad faith); Asmussen v. Comm’r, N.H. Dep’t of Safety, 145 N.H. 578, 596 (2000) (regarding substantial benefit); see also Dow v. Town of Effingham, 148 N.H. 121, 133 (2002) (“In this case, the plaintiff is not entitled to attorney’s fees because he is not the prevailing party.”).

Dow v. Town of Effingham, 148 N.H. 121, 125 (2002).

“It is well settled that an elementary and fundamental requirement of due process is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Dow v. Town of Effingham, 148 N.H. 121, 129 (2002) (quotation omitted).

Id.; see also Dow v. Town of Effingham, 148 N.H. 121, 132-33 (2002) (race track ordinance is not void for vagueness because it does not specify the exact standards required by the selectmen in assessing a request for a race track permit; it is implied that the selectmen will exercise their discretion consistent with the purpose of the race track ordinance).

Dow v. Town of Effingham, 148 N.H. 121, 124 (2002).

Dow v. Town of Effingham, 148 N.H. 121, 124, 803 A.2d 1059 (2002).

In an as-applied challenge, such as CRJ’s, we examine “the relationship of the particular ordinance to particular property under particular conditions existing at the time of litigation.” Dow v. Town of Effingham, 148 N.H. 121, 124 (2002).

Dow v. Town of Effingham, 148 N.H. 121, 124 (2002).

Dow v. Town of Effingham, 148 N.H. 121, 124 (2002).

g growth due to ‘unusual circumstances’ and unduly restricts fundamental rights.” The trial court declined to address this claim because it could not “evaluate the Association’s as applied challenges without more specific information about the nature and scope of the rights and/or titles that have allegedly been affected by the [interim growth management ordinance].” See Dow v. Town of Effingham, 148 N.H. 121, 124 (2002) (a substantive due process challenge to an ordinance questions the fundamen

“Since all zoning regulations are imposed under the police power,” requiring that the variance not adversely affect the public health, safety or welfare “probably applies whether or not it is spelled out in the ordinance.” *582 Young, supra § 20.14, at 444-45; see Dow v. Town of Effingham, 148 N.H. 121, 126 (2002).

Dow v. Town of Effingham, 148 N.H. 121, 133 (2002).

Dow v. Town of Effingham, 148 N.H. 121, 124 (2002).

“A substantive due process challengé to an ordinance questions the fundamental fairness of an ordinance both generally and in the *145 relationship of the particular ordinance to particular property under particular conditions existing at the time of litigation.” Dow v. Town of Effingham, 148 N.H. 121, 124 (2002) (quotation omitted).

“The property owner who claims a vested right bears the burden of proving all necessary elements establishing that right.” Dow v. Town of Effingham, 148 N.H. 121, 130 (2002).

Dow v. Town of Effingham, 148 N.H. 121, 124 (2002).

Dow v. Town of Effingham, 148 N.H. 121,124 (2002).