Cited by

The defendant argues that the trial court must make a specific finding of criminal conduct, see Fillmore v. Fillmore, 147 N.H. 283, 285 (2001), and that the court’s “amorphous finding” of “gross neglect” does not satisfy this standard.

Fisher v. Minichiello, 155 N.H. 188, 193 (2007); Fillmore v. Fillmore, 147 N.H. 283, 285 (2001).

Fisher v. Minichiello, 155 N.H. 188, 193 (2007); Fillmore v. Fillmore, 147 N.H. 283, 285 (2001).

Compare Thompson v. D’Errico, 163 N.H. 20, 23 (2011) (finding no error in the trial court’s reliance upon, among other acts, an attempted assault that occurred within six months of the filing of the petition), with Fillmore v. Fillmore, 147 N.H. 283, 284-86 (2001) (holding that two incidents of physical abuse occurring eight and eleven years prior to the petition were too stale to show current abuse).

make a specific finding of criminal conduct in order to issue a final restraining order against a defendant.” Fillmore v. Fillmore, 147 N.H. 283, 285 (2001).

Walker, 158 N.H. at 608 (“[incidents which are too distant in time and non-specific cannot support a finding of abuse under RSA chapter 173-B” (quotations and citation omitted)); Fillmore v. Fillmore, 147 N.H. 283, 286 (2001) (holding that two incidents of physical abuse occurring eight and eleven years prior to the petition and a months-old threat to make the plaintiffs life “a living hell” were insufficient to show current abuse).

We reasoned that “in order to be consistent with our interpretation of RSA 173-B:5 in [Fillmore v. Fillmore, 147 N.H. 283 (2001)], we must conclude that RSA 633:3-a, 11(a), which also contains an enumerated list of prohibited conduct, likewise requires specific findings of the course of conduct, which is defined as two or more acts.” Id.

“[W]e review sufficiency of the evidence claims as a matter of law, and uphold the findings and rulings of the trial court unless they are lacking in evidential support or tainted by error of law.” Fillmore v. Fillmore, 147 N.H. 283, 284 (2001) (quotation omitted); see RSA 173-B:3, VI (Supp. 2010).

Tosta v. Bullis, 156 N.H. 763, 767 (2008); Fillmore v. Fillmore, 147 N.H. 283, 286 (2001).

Fillmore v. Fillmore, 147 N.H. 283, 286 (2001) (holding two incidents of physical abuse occurring eight and eleven years prior to the petition were insufficient to show current abuse).

In Tosta, we reiterated that “we have required that the threshold misconduct prompting a domestic violence petition be neither ‘too distant in time’ nor ‘non-specific.’ ” Tosta, 156 N.H. at 767 (quoting Fillmore v. Fillmore, 147 N.H. 283, 286 (2001)).

Fisher v. Minichiello, 155 N.H. 188, 193 (2007); see also Fillmore v. Fillmore, 147 N.H. 283, 285 (2001) (interpreting domestic violence protective order statutes, see RSA 173-B:1,:5 (2002), to impose similar requirement).

“[W]e review sufficiency of the evidence claims as a matter of law, and uphold the findings and rulings of the trial court unless they are lacking in evidential support or tainted by error of law.” Fillmore v. Fillmore, 147 N.H. 283, 284 (2001) (quotation omitted); see RSA 173-B:3, VI.

Fisher, 155 N.H. at 193; cf. Fillmore v. Fillmore, 147 N.H. 283, 284 (2001) (vacating the issuance of a protective order under RSA chapter 173-B where the trial court failed to make specific findings as to the defendant’s purportedly illegal conduct).

We are the final arbiter of the meaning of a statute as expressed by the words of the statute itself.

We interpret a statute to lead to a reasonable result and review a particular provision, not in isolation, but together with all associated sections.” Fillmore v. Fillmore, 147 N.H. 283, 285 (2001) (quotation omitted).